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DEMOCRACY FOR SALE:

THE NEED FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
Kathleen A. Welch
Representative democracy in America is up for sale.
Like farmers at a livestock auction, special interest groups
are clamoring to place their bids on the members of Congress most likely to produce the best return on their investment. The present system of financing federal elections in
this country has effectively placed Congress on the auction block, resulting in a dangerous erosion of our democratic institutions.
The influence of special interest money in electoral
campaigns perverts the democratic process and seriously
undermines principles of political participation and equality that are at the heart of the American system of government. The ability of organized interests to aggregate wealth
and political power through political action committees
(PACs) not only affects the outcome of elections and policy debates, but also vitiates legislative accountability.
Perhaps the most insidious threat to democracy posed by
the union of money and politics is the growing cynicism
and diminished political participation among individual
voters.!
Congressional efforts to curb the negative influence of
special interest money in American politics have been severely impeded by the Supreme Court and have thus been
largely ineffective. The Court's landmark decision in Buckley v. Valeo2 essentially granted constitutional protection
to the polluting role of concentrated wealth in elections.
Under the present campaign finance system, the notion of "oneperson, one votd' has been rendered meaningless. An urgent need exists for broad reforms in campaign
spending laws, as well as a re-evaluation of the Supreme
Court's precedents in this area. This article examines the
history and judicial review of federal campaign finance laws,
analyzes the effect of uncontrolled campaign spending on
the democratic process, and offers proposals for reform.

Kathleen A. Welch is a J.D. Candidate, May 1991, State
University of New York at Buffalo, School of Law. Welch
has worked as a community organizer and lobbyist for
citizen groups in New York and Texas. Welch also served
for four years as the energy policy coordinatorfor a national consumer and environmental organization in
Washington, D.C.
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History of Campaign Finance in America
Although campaign financing emerged as a major issue in the 1832 presidential race between Andrew Jackson and Henry Clay,3 it was not until 1867 that Congress
enacted the first restrictions on campaign activity. The
Naval Appropriations Bill of 18674 prohibited government
employees from soliciting money for political purposes from
workers in the naval yards. Ongoing concern over the effects of the spoils system in federal employment led to
enactment of the Civil Service Reforms Act in 1883. This
law made it illegal for any federal employee to solicit campaign funds from another federal employee.
The 'muckraking" era of the early twentieth century led
to passage of the Tillman Act 6 in 1907 which prohibited
a corporation or national bank from making contributions
from their treasuries to campaigns for federal office.7 During the next several years, requirements for campaign contribution disclosures were enacted, as well as the first
expenditure limits for congressional candidates.
Congress revised the campaign finance system by
enacting the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, which
remained the principal campaign finance law until the early 1970's.8 The Act 'continued the existing prohibitions on
contributions by corporations and banks, and required the
reporting of campaign receipts and expenditures, but...was
infinitely evadable and was never really enforced."9
The discovery of massive campaign abuses during the
Watergate scandal,'0 and the skyrocketing costs of campaigns, prompted a government reform movement that culminated in the passage of sweeping campaigning finance
laws in the early 1970's." The Federal Election Campaign
Act (FECA), enacted in 1971 and amended in 1974, created
a comprehensive system of campaign finance restrictions.!
The Act contained six primary features:
(1)

rigid spending limits for federal candidates;

(2)

limits on the amounts any individual or committee could contribute to any candidate;

(3)

public financing in presidential campaigns;

(4) requirements for disclosure and reporting of
campaign contributions and expenditures;
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(5)

the creation of the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to enforce campaign laws and oversee elections; and

(6)

explicit approval for corporations and labor unions to utilize their treasuries to solicit political
action committee (PAC) contributions and administer PACs.

The Act had a tremendous impact on the financing of
American politics. In particular was the dramatic growth
of PACs, entities which represent the economic, ideological or other interests of people by pooling money and distributing it directly and indirectly to the campaigns of
individual candidates. Many PACs are affiliated with labor
unions or corporations, although there are a large number
affiliated with trade associations, membership organizations, ideological groups, and groups representing
a par13
ticular cause such as the environment.
According to Philip Stem, director of Citizens Against
PACs, an organization that vigorously supports comprehensive campaign finance reform, "the 1974 law set off a
PAC explosion." 14 The Center for Responsive Politics, a national organization that conducts research on congressional
and political trends, reports that "the number of PACs grew
from 608 in 1974 to 4,828 by the end of 1988. Their total
contributions to congressional candidates skyrocketed from
$12.5 million in 1974 to more than $151 million in 1988." "
Judicial Review of Campaign Finance Laws
The campaign finance structure designed by Congress
in FECA was dismantled by the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo.!6 The Buckley Court equated
campaign spending with speech and declared that the
FECA restrictions affected "an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities " 7 Regulation of campaign
spending should, in the Court's view, be "subject to the
closest scrutiny,' 8 but a compelling government interest
could nonetheless justify burdens on free speech. The Court
"sought to balance the First Amendment rights of free
speech and free association against the power of Congress
to enact laws designed to protect the integrity of federal
elections " 9
Specifically, the Buckley decision struck down three
of FECAs spending restrictions: (1) the limitations on independent expenditures made by individuals or groups on
behalf of a candidate; (2) the limits on the amount of personal or family funds a candidate can spend on her/his own
campaign; and (3) the aggregate limit on campaign expenditures. 20 The Court upheld the restrictions on direct con22
tributions to candidates, 2' the disclosure requirements,
and the establishment of the Federal Election Commission.23 The system for public financing of presidential elections was also left intact, 24 and the Court explicitly stated
that Congress could condition acceptance of those funds
25
with spending limits.
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In declaring major provisions of FECA unconstitutional, the Supreme Court drew a highly questionable distinction between the effect of limits on direct contributions to
a candidate - which were held permissible - and restrictions on "independent" expenditures - which were rejected. "Independent" expenditures included money given to and
spent by "independent" individuals or organizations, principally PACs.2 6 In contrast to direct contributions to candidates, "independent" expenditures were in the eyes of the
Court, made without coordination with the candidate
In upholding the limitations on direct contributions, the
Buckley Court stated that such limits "entail[ed] only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in
free communication"" Moreover, the Court concluded that
Congress' interest in preventing "the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial
contributions" was a "constitutionally sufficient justification
for contribution limitations. 28 Acknowledging the corrosive
influence of campaign contributions, the Court stated, "to
the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders,
the integrity of the system of representative democracy is
undermined "29 Although the Court recognized the difficulty
in proving the scope of such "pemicious practices,"30 it con3
cluded that the problem was "not an illusory one l
The Court further emphasized the danger of "the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness
of the opportunities for abuse 3 2 in a system allowing large
financial contributions. According to the Buckley Court, it
would be legitimate for Congress to conclude that "the
avoidance of the appearance of improper influence 'is also
critical if the confidence in the system of representative
33
government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent'"
Expenditure limitations, according to the Court,
"represent[ed] substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech" and
thus violated the First Amendment.34 The Court, in apparent contradiction, found that the ceiling on independent expenditures failed to "serve any substantial governmental
interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in the electoral process' 3 and therefore did not justify an infringement of the First Amendment.
The Buckley Court based its conclusion in part on the
lack of empirical evidence of the effect of independent expenditures. The Court stated, "independent advocacy restricted by the provision does not presently appear to pose
dangers of real or apparent corruption compared to those
identified with large campaign contributions "36
The Buckley v. Valeo decision has been met with considerable criticism by many commentators and advocates
of campaign finance reform.3 7 U.S. Court of Appeals Judge
J. Skelly Wright, who decided Buckley in the lower court
and was a vociferous advocate of campaign spending limits,
described the Supreme Court's decision as "tragically misguided."38 Indeed, the Court's rationale for the direct
contribution-independent expenditure distinction is ex-
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tremely weak and does not appear to be grounded in the
reality of contemporary American politics. Nevertheless, the
Buckley decision continues to be the leading judicial precedent governing campaign finance restrictions.
Subsequent Supreme Court reviews of campaign
finance laws have reinforced the First Amendment protections granted in Buckley. 9 The collective jurisprudence in
this area suggests, however, that if it could be shown that
campaign expenditures, like contributions, pose a serious
threat of actual or potential corruption, the Supreme Court
might reconsider the Buckley doctrine.4"
In FirstNational Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,4" decided
two years after Buckley v. Valeo, the Court struck down
a Massachusetts ordinance limiting corporate expenditures
on ballot initiatives. Significantly, the Court stated that if
it could be shown that corporate advocacy 'threatened imminently to undermine the democratic process...these arguments would merit our consideration' 4 2 In a 1986 case,
FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,43 the Supreme
Court again recognized the potential for corruption arising
out of corporate advocacy:
This concern over the corrosive influence of
concentrated corporate wealth reflects the conviction that it is important to protect the integrity of the marketplace of ideas...Direct corporate
spending on political activity raises the prospect
that resources amassed in the economic marketplace may be used to provide an unfair ad44
vantage in the political marketplace.
In MassachusettsCitizensfor Life (MCFL), the Court
found unconstitutional the requirement in FECA Section
316 that ideological nonprofit corporations create PACs in
order to make independent campaign expenditures. According to the Court, such groups are formed to disseminate
political ideals, not to amass capital, and thus do not pose
the danger of corruption that justifies regulation of expenditures from their treasuries. 41 In lengthy dicta, however, the
five member majority explained why such a restriction on
business corporations would be constitutional. According
to one commentator, the Court's opinion, "says as much
about why the political expression of business corporations
may be regulated as it says about why the expression of
MCFL was not .4 The dicta in MCFL suggests additional
regulation of corporate PACs - including limits on expenditures - might be upheld if it could be demonstrated that
corporate PAC expenditures resulted in corruption through
the "unfair deployment of wealth for political purposes."4
However, in FederalElection Commission v. National
Conservative PoliticalAction Committee (NCPAC),48 the
Court made it clear that demonstrating the corrupting effect of independent expenditures would be extremely
difficult. The Court declared unconstitutional a $1,000 limit
on expenditures by PACs for the benefit of presidential candidates who voluntarily accepted public financing. The
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Supreme Court based its decision on the lack of compelling government interest since there was "no potential for
corruption 49 related to the PAC expenditures. According

to the majority in the NCPAC decision:
The fact that candidates and elected officials
may alter or reaffirm their own positions on issues in response to political messages paid for
by the PACs can hardly be called corruption,
for one of the essential features of democracy
is the presentation
to the electorate of varying
50
points of view.

As in Buckley, the NCPAC Court further found that
because the expenditures were made "independently' rather
than by the candidate, there was no danger of corruption
sufficient to justify the limitation. In the Courts view, the
"absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines
the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given a quid
pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate."'
This decision was reached in spite of extensive evidence
presented by the FEC which demonstrated the corrupting
influence of PAC expenditures.5 2
Reconsidering the Buckley v. Valeo doctrine
Future efforts by Congress to reform campaign
finance laws will continue to be significantly constrained
by the Supreme Courts decisions in Buckley and more recent campaign finance cases. Nonetheless, at least two
limited opportunities for judicial reconsideration emerge.
First, a case could be made to demonstrate, based on new
and more extensive evidence, the actuality and appearance
of corruption that arises from the present campaign finance
system. Second, other compelling government interests
might convince a majority
of the Court to allow greater res53
trictions on financing.
A. The corrupting effect of the present campaign finance system on the democratic process.
Democracy in America is perceived as a system of
representative government, where individual citizens choose
leaders to represent their interests by exercising their right
to vote. Participation in politics, beyond the vote, is widely
valued as important to the proper functioning of democratic
government.
At the root of American democracy is the ideal of political equality. In the Federalist Papers, James Madison
described the nature of political equality in what would become this country's system of government.
Who are to be the electors of the Federal Representatives? Not the rich more than the poor;
not the learned, more than the ignorant; not
the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more
IN THE PUBuC INTEREST

than the humble sons of obscurity and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great
54
body of the people of the United States.
55
As Chief Justice Warren wrote in Reynolds v. Sims,
"Representative government is in essence self-government
through the medium of elected representatives of the people, and each and every citizen has an inalienable right to
full and effective participation in the political processes of
his State's legislative bodies. 6
The unfortunate reality is that the dramatic rise in the
price of campaigns and the influence of special interest
money in politics have severely distorted the political
process and destroyed notions of political equality supposedly inherent in American democracy. Rather than
representing the constituents who voted for them, members of Congress seem to be in the business of raising
money, assuring reelection, and representing the concerns
of the special interests who line their campaign coffers. Uncontrolled campaign spending - the legacy of Buckley has created a system dependent upon PAC money that
favors incumbents and candidates with personal wealth.
The voices of individual citizens have been seriously diluted by the influence of those with organized economic pow57

er.

Campaign spending has risen enormously since the
1970s, particularly among candidates for the Senate and
House of Representatives. In the 1988 election cycle, congressional candidates spent a total of $457.7 million, up
from $115.5 million in 1976.8 The costs of electoral campaigns has diminished the responsiveness of members of
Congress to the individual voter. Many members have been
forced to become professional fundraisers first and
democratic representatives second. In 1988, the average
cost of winning a campaign for a seat in the House of
Representatives was $399,000, and just over $4 million for
the Senate.5 9 This means that each member of the House
would have to raise nearly $17,000 per month during a twoyear term, and Senators would be required to raise almost
$56,000 per month during their six-year term. One former
Congressman estimated that Senate candidates spend
roughly 80-90 percent of their time raising money, rather
than truly discussing the issues with voters. 60 These fundraising demands have made it extremely difficult for members of Congress to be truly responsive to the individual
voting constituent.
There is a direct correlation between the amount of
money spent in an election and the result. For example, in
more than half of the races for the U.S. House of Representatives in 1988, the winner outspent the loser by a factor
of ten to one or greater. 61 The rising costs of elections and
the inherent advantages of incumbency have led to what
one watchdog group calls 'the permanent Congress. 62 More
than 98 percent of incumbents in the House of Representatives won reelection in both 1986 and 1988.63 Incumbents
in congressional races have a seemingly insurmountable ad-

SPRING 1990

vantage over challengers, in large part because of their ability to raise special interest money and to "stockpild'
campaign funds.
As of January 1989, House members of the newly
elected 101st Congress had amassed more than $67 million - an average of $154,000 each - in their campaign
warchests for future elections. 64 According to Public
Citizen's Congress Watch:
Large campaign "warchests" ...often discourage
otherwise likely and qualified challengers from
running .... Because the American public is
offered few options among candidates, it can
expect limited debate on the issues as well as
diminished accountability. As a result, incumbents are reelected at unprecedented rates,
creating a 'permanenf Congress - one which
often fails to represent
the prevailing views of
65
the American public.
Competition in the political marketplace is at an all time
low. In a report on campaign spending in the 1988 elections, the Center for Responsive Politics pointed to a range
of reasons for this situation:
Considering a variety of factors - the record
low number of new members elected, the gap
in spending between winners and losers, the
vast disparity in fund raising between incumbents and challengers, and the highest incumbent reelection rate since 1792 - the
congressional elections of 1988 may well have
been the least competitive in the history of the
66
United States.
Further tainting the electoral process is the fact that
the source of much of these campaign funds are the special interest PACs, who seem to have an unlimited capacity to raise money.67 In the first six months of 1987, the
leading corporate, labor, trade association, and professional
PACs (i.e. those that solicited over $100,000 in contributions) raised nearly $30 million, more than double the
amount raised over the same period in 1983.68
There is little doubt that the aim of the PACs is to buy
access and influence votes. According to Archibald Cox,
Chairman of the citizen watchdog group Common Cause
and one of the lead attorneys in the Buckley case, "it is
universally agreed that money buys access to legislators
and executive officials."69 Efforts by the PACs to control
the democratic process through elections and policy debates are well-documented and accepted in political circles.7" Larry Sabato, a political scientist who has written
extensively on PACs, asserts, "Members of Congress have
themselves frequently offered the harshest interpretations
of the effect of PAC money on their voting proclivities"7

Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole of Kansas has observed, 'When these PACs give they expect something in
return other than good government: 72 Representative Tom
Downey of New York put it even more bluntly, 'You can't
buy a congressman for $5,000. But you can buy his vote.
It's done on a regular basis:73
Even PAC representatives themselves admit that their
goal is to further their own group's special interests. The
director of the American Trucking Association made this
clear when he stated, "We'll buy a ticket to anyones fundraising event, as long as he [sic] didn't vote the wrong way
4
on trucking issues."

Looking at PAC giving patterns, their influence-buying
motives are readily apparent. PACs have a remarkable pattern of favoritism toward incumbents.75 In 1988, PACs gave
approximately 74 percent of their contributions to incumbents. PACs attempt to ensure access by giving to both
candidates in a contest, contributing to candidates whose
philosophy they don't necessarily share and, after elections,
giving to a winning candidate they had previously attempted
to defeat." It is difficult to imagine any other motive for
PAC giving than what amounts to legalized bribe. It certainly seems improbable that PACs would have expended
such large sums of money if they didnt think it would purchase something.
Although it is not easy to empirically document a quid
pro quo connection between PAC contributions and expenditures and legislative outcomes, there are innumerable examples that suggest a strong correlation.
Studies of issue after issue demonstrate that a
much higher percentage of legislators who voted with a PAC's position received money from
that PAC in the previous campaign than those
who voted the other way, and among the
beneficiaries of PAC money, those supporting
the PAC position had received a substantially
higher average contribution.77
PACs tend to concentrate their giving on members of
Committees with jurisdiction and control over their interest.
For example, a 1987 study by Common Cause revealed
that the top ten defense industry contractors concentrated 41 percent of their 1986 contributions and three-quarters
of their 1985 honoraria on the 18 percent of lawmakers
who make up the defense-related committees of Congress.' On the average, PACs contribute 20 percent moreto the Chairs of House Committees than other representatives.79
The tactics of PACs are not necessarily subtle or hidden in the record books of the Federal Election Commission. In 1981, the National Conservative Political Action
Committee (NCPAC), sent the following message to a
member of Congress:
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If you will make a public statement in support
of the President's tax cut package and state that
you intend to vote for it, we will withdraw all
[independent, hostile] radio and newspaper ads
planned in your district. In addition, we will be
glad to run radio and newspaper ads applauding you for your vote to lower taxes.80
Such evidence suggests that prearrangement and collaboration between PACs and official candidate campaigns
is common. "In actual practice, the activities of candidateoriented PACs are coordinated and integrated with the official campaign effort' 8 Proof that coordination between "independent" spenders and campaigns certainly weakens the
Buckley Court's rationale that "independent" expenditures
do not threaten to corrupt the political system. Furthermore,
in todaVs sophisticated media oriented campaign process,
direct coordination is no longer necessary for "independent"
expenditures to directly influence campaign outcomes and
for candidates to recognize a PACs efforts on her behalf.82
The effect of PAC influence-peddling on legislative and
electoral outcomes raises serious questions about just who
Congress represents. One result of this distortion of
representative government is often that when special interest groups prevail, huge costs are shouldered by the rest
of the citizens. For example, in the late 1980's, the financial lobbying tactics of one special interest left the American taxpayer holding an enormous bill. During what has become known as the savings and loan (S&L) scandal, an owner of a failed S&L and his associates directed $1.3 million to
the campaigns and political causes of five U.S. Senators.
These Senators intervened on behalf of the failing S&L to
discourage banking regulators from taking action. The Senators later became the subject of ethics investigations. As
a consequence, taxpayers will be forced to pay more than
83
$2 billion to bail out the bank.
Legislators who have been the beneficiaries of spending by outside special interest PACs (collections of individuals who cannot vote for them) may become less
accountable to their true constituents:
The PACs and their lobbyists are often able to
push their way in through the turnstiles ahead
of a lawmaker's own constituents, even though
they do not live, vote, or pay taxes in the lawmakers state or district. To the extent that this
is so, the influence of local voters is diluted.84
According to Representative Leon Panetta of California, "It's now tough to hear the voices of the citizens in your
district. Sometimes the only things you can hear are the
loud voices of the three-piece suits carrying a PAC check.85
Defenders of PACs suggest that the evolution of PACs
is simply a manifestation of pluralism. Herbert Alexander,
an expert in the field of campaign finance points out that,
PAC proponents stress that contributions are made by emIN THE PUBUC INTEREST

I
ployees, of their own free will, and that their aggregate political voice, meeting with other such voices in the political
arena, form something close to the textbook ideal of
pluralist democracy: 86 It has also been argued that "PACs
provide an effective voice for people who would not otherwise be heard 8 7 Those who advocate 'PAC democracy"
also point out that PACs have "mobilized a substantial number of Americans to participate in politics, 88 thus enhancing participatory democracy.
These claims of "PAC democracy" are ill-founded. PAC
participation in politics falls far short of the pluralistic ideal
of political equality through competing interest groups, because many segments and interests of the electorate are
not represented. As Senator Robert Dole has said, "There
aren't any Poor PACs or Food Stamp PACs or Nutrition
PACs or Medicare PACs: 89
Furthermore, political participation in PACs hardly
reflects the traditional notion of participatory democracy:
PACs tend to be bureaucratically organized and
centralized, often at the national level. The voice
of the PAC is not that of its small givers whose
participation is extolled by PAC pluralists, but
of its leadership who decide where to bestow
the money.90
This point has been further emphasized by David
Adamany, a legal scholar and political scientist who has
written extensively on campaign finance: 'The real or effective financial constituency in these circumstances is the
PAC and its leadership, not the small givers to the PAC
campaign warchests. The candidate knows the programs
and objectives of the PAC officers that [sic] preferred access is given.""
The ability of PACs to aggregate wealth and magnify
their political influence without regard to the size of their
membership, results in a form of 'multiple voting. 92 Multiple voting is an effort to expand "influence beyond the single ballot to which all citizens are legally entitled."9 3 It is
precisely this undue influence that poses such a grave threat
to political equality and American democracy. According
to Adamany, "money's extreme potential for multiple voting points to an important issue of political finance policy
in democracy: preventing gross inequalities in the meaning
94
of the vote"
Contrary to the Supreme Court's conclusion in Buckley and its progeny, 95 it is widely held in the academic and
political worlds alike that "money is a corrupting influence
and that PAC money, being the most concentrated and the
most blatant, is the most dangerous of all."96 The accumulation of evidence demonstrating the actuality of corruption stemming from PAC contributions and expenditures
since the Buckley decision merits reconsideration by the
Court.
Additionally, the documented effects of the present system on public confidence in government illustrate that the
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appearance of corruption, an interest the Supreme Court
declared significant enough to allow First Amendment infringement, has not been avoided.97 Statements made fre-

quently by members of Congress indicate that elected
officials themselves believe the present system creates both
the appearance and actuality of corruption.9 8 The most convincing evidence of the public's concern for the corrupt nature of campaign financing can be found in survey research.
In an independent poll sponsored by national citizen groups
in March 1990, 30 percent of voters polled said that their
own member of Congress is "caught up and corrupted by
the system of money and politics" and another 27 percent
stated that they did not know. 99 Previous survey research
has also reflected the public's concern for the influence of
special interest money.0 0
B. Other compelling government interests
The Buckley decision indicated that further regulation
of campaign spending could be upheld if other significant
government interests were demonstrated. ° I In the years following Buckley, at least two critical government interests
have become apparent: the preservation of representative
democracy and the restoration of the electoral process as
the primary means by which individual citizens participate
equally in politics. Although the Supreme Court failed in
Buckley and subsequent cases to identify these interests
as compelling, current evidence indicates that they may be
significant enough to support additional campaign finance
restrictions.
The escalating cost of campaigns and candidates' increasing dependence on special interest funds have distorted representative democracy. An even greater threat to the
future of American democracy is the growing cynicism and
apathy of the American voter toward the electoral process.
Former Senator Charles McC. Mathias, a Republican from
Maryland, pointedly raised the issue of public confidence
when he stated:
Almost as bad as the potential for inequity and
corruption in the current system of campaign
finance is the general perception of undue influence The latest Harris poll shows that 84
percent of americans...believe that 'those who
contribute large sums of money have too much
influence over the government! Now, I have no
doubt that this cynicism contributes to our terrible state of voter apathy, apathy to the extent
that over half of the eligible voters do not bother
02
to turn out for congressional elections'
According to Archibald Cox, 'The close correlation between PAC contributions and legislation breeds cynicism
and then alienation from the political process"' 0 3 Existing
statistical evidence exists which indicates that increasing
apathy and alienation of the general public has resulted in
a dramatic decline in voter turnout

0
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In testimony on cam3'

paign financing before a Senate Judiciary Subcommittee,
Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA) stated:
With each drop in public confidence or each increase in public cynicism we run the risk of irreparably damaging our democratic system. It
is no coincidence that voter participation, which
has steadily declined during the second century of our democracy had done so during a time
of rising campaign costs and public lack of confidence...So dire is the situation that more people watched the Superbowl this year than voted
0 5
in the 1988 Presidential elections.!
Elizabeth Drew, a noted author and political journalist,
effectively summed up the real costs of the current system
of campaign finance in her book, Money and Politics:
We are paying in the declining quality of politicians and of the legislative product and in the
rising public cynicism. We have allowed it to become increasingly difficult for good people who
remain in politics to function well. What results
is a corrosion of the system and a new kind of
squalor.....As the public cynicism gets deeper,
the political system gets worse Until the
problem is dealt with, the system will not get
better. We have allowed the basic idea of our
democratic process - representative govem06
ment - to slip away.
As Dean Rosenthal of Columbia University described
the interest in restoring the electoral process:
The goal of enriching the electoral system,
through broadening the base of citizen influence
and reducing inequities in the opportunities of
candidates and their supporters to persuade the
electorate, is a worthy one; it is not only consistent with but indispensable to the attainment
of one of the most fundamental purposes of the
Constitution.0 7
The Buckley doctrine that prohibits limitations on "independent" expenditures should be overruled and further
campaign finance restrictions should be allowed. Based
upon the convincing evidence that actual and perceived corruption have not been avoided, the Supreme Court should
also acknowledge other compelling government interests
that justify more stringent regulations of campaign
financing.
Reforming the Campaign Finance System
The aim of efforts to restructure our present system
of financing election campaigns should be to lessen the influence of "interested money that is, money spent with the
8

expectation of some type of direct or indirect return.
Another important goal should be to reduce the costs of
campaigns. Candidates and elected officials need to be
freed from the constant demands to raise exhorbitant sums
of money. Elected officials should be responsible to the constituents who vote for them, not those special interests who
finance their campaigns. The campaign finance system
should encourage political competition, allowing candidates
without personal wealth a fair opportunity to run for office
Finally, campaign finance reforms should encourage open
public debate on the issues, and individual citizen participation in the democratic process.
Any attempts by Congress to reform the campaign
finance system will be subject to the restrictive constitutional guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in Buckley and its progeny. Mounting evidence of the corrupting
influence of money on politics and the emergence of additional compelling government interests could move a majority of the Court to allow limitations on "independent"
expenditures and further limitations on direct contributions.
Such limitations are essential to effectively loosen the stranglehold special interests appear to have on members of
Congress and the democratic process.
Any legislative reforms of the campaign finance system will undoubtedly be met with political as well as constitutional obstacles. While many members of Congress
decry the high costs of elections and influence-peddling of
the PACs,""8 many continue to be resistant to changing the
system that elected them. Nevertheless, the political climate
in Washington seems to be ripe for change. The recent savings and loan scandal and the extensive ethics investigations of members of Congress over the past few years, have
underscored the urgent need for an overhaul of the campaign finance system.'0 9 President Bush is the first Republican President since Teddy Roosevelt to declare campaign
finance reform a priority issue, and both the Senate Majority
Leader and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
have pledged to bring this matter to a vote."0
The demand for broad campaign finance reforms is
widespread. A coalition of 56 national organizations was
formed in February 1990 to advocate for comprehensive
changes in the present system." Surveys also indicate
strong and rising support for campaign finance reforms
among the American electorate. In a poll released in March
1990, 58 percent of American voters stated that they would
support public financing for candidates for Congress and
a ban on private contributions; only 33 percent expressed
opposition. The poll also found that 77 percent of those
surveyed supported an overall spending cap on congressional campaigns, and 71 percent favored severe restrictions on contributions by PACs.! 2 Finally, many academic
and legal commentators have pointed to the need for a new
system for financing elections in order to prevent political
3
money from distorting legislative decisionmaking '
A comprehensive package of legislative reforms designed to abide by the Supreme Courts doctrine on camIN THE PUBUC INTEREST

paign finance - should include four major components:
1) public financing and overall spending caps in congressional elections; 2) measures to reduce the costs of campaigns; 3) limits on PAC contributions; and 4) measures
to close certain loopholes in existing campaign finance laws.
Additionally, Congress should strengthen the enforcement
powers and independence of the Federal Election Commission, the agency in charge of overseeing the implementation of campaign finance regulations!' 4
1) Public financing of
congressional campaigns
A system of public financing for congressional races,
like the system now in place for presidential elections, would
reduce the influence of PACs in House and Senate elections." 5 It could also help to restore real competition in the
political marketplace In general, a public financing system
would allow a candidate to receive public funds once she
raised a threshold amount of small private contributions
and agreed to adhere to voluntary spending limits. According to Fred Wertheimer, President of Common Cause, the
advantages of public financing are:
(1)

Candidates would be less dependent on special interest groups' contributions because they
would have an alternative way to finance their
races.

(2)

Incumbents would have less of a financial advantage than they now have. Challengers would
be able to have small contributions collected
from supporters matched by public funds. The
amount of funds available to challengers should
increase substantially.

(3)

It would be to a candidate's advantage to try
to get as many small individual contributions
as possible, because each of these small con16
tributions would be matched by public funds!'

Public Citizen has argued that, "the effort to drive special interest money out of the system will only succeed if
it is replaced by untainted funds" and that public financing
is the best mechanism to achieve that goal.' 7 Public Citizen
also argues that public financing will benefit incumbents
and challengers alike" 8
Public financing of congressional races has received wide
support?' 9 In the words of Judge J. Skelly Wright, "with
one stroke public financing could do much to remove the
poison of money from the political bloodstream - even
within the confines of the narrow constitutional2 °limitations
the present Supreme Court imposes on us.1
2) Measures to reduce costs of campaigns
In order to dilute the influence of special interest money
on elections, it is necessary to lessen the need for politiSPRING 1990

clans to raise enormous sums for their campaigns. Public
financing coupled with voluntary spending limits is one way
to do this." Congress should also enact measures which
would help to bring down the costs of campaigns, particularly media costs. Campaigns have become increasingly dependent upon costly television advertising, which has
become the primary source of the rising cost of campaigning! 2 2 In the past, Congress has required television stations
to provide air time to candidates at reduced rates prior to
primary and general elections. 23 It has also been proposed
that Congress require broadcasters to allow for a specified
amount of free air time for candidates.!24 Free air time could
be utilized as a forum for substantive public debate of the
issues facing voters. Congress could also lower postal rates
for congressional campaigns, thus allowing candidates to
communicate directly with individual voters at reduced
costs. Although incremental in nature, such cost reduction
measures could do much to mitigate the burden of rising
campaign costs.
3) Limits on PAC contributions
Further limiting the amount that PACs can directly contribute to candidates would help to diminish their undue
influence. Under the FECA, PACs may now contribute up
to $5,000 to each candidate; individuals may contribute
up to $1,000. There is no limit on the overall amount a candidate can receive from all PACs. 25 Proponents of limits
on PAC contributions believe more restrictive limits need
to be placed on both individual PAC contributions and the
aggregate amount of PAC money a member of Congress
can receive. 26 In support of the aggregate contribution limit,
David Adamany has stated, "this kind of aggregate contribution limit addresses the danger of a coalition contributing in which many corporations, trade associations and
unions with similar interests dominate the financial constituency of members of Congress who hold key leadership
1 27
or committee seats:
4) Measures to close loopholes
in existing law
Under FECA, a loophole currently exists that allows
unlimited contributions from corporations, unions, and
wealthy individuals to political parties, as long as they are
directed into "soft money" accounts. "Soft money" consists
of funds used for such activities as voter registration, getout-the-vote campaigns and other party building efforts. According to Public Citizen, "soft money presents two major
problems:
First, since many of the "soft money" activities
are designed to influence federal elections, it
represents a flagrant evasion of spending limits.
Second, it is a vehicle for corporations, unions
and wealthy individuals to give 'tremendous
sums of money (sometimes exceeding
$100,000) with the hope of later gaining in28
fluence and access.!
39

Public Citizen has proposed that "soft money contributions
intended to affect federal elections should be subject to the
same limits placed on contributions made directly to fed" 29
eral candidates.
Achieving a political consensus on comprehensive
campaign finance reforms within the Congress will no doubt
prove extremely difficult. Since the Buckley decision, many
30
unsuccessful attempts at reform have been made
However, in light of growing public support for changes,
and recent political scandals, the prospects for reform may
be better than ever. In the 101st Congress, more than 30
pieces of legislation dealing with some aspect of campaign
finance reform were introduced. These legislative proposals
addressed a wide range of campaign finance reforms; some
of the bills included many of the elements necessary for
comprehensive reform? 31In March 1990, a bipartisan panel
of experts appointed by Congress released a compromise
package of proposals that some politicians believed could
32
be a catalyst for a final legislative consensus on this issue.
Although the compromise package may break a political
logjam, it has been widely criticized as too weak to
resolve
33
our present crisis in the financing of elections.
Unfortunately, the nature of the political process suggests that whatever reforms Congress enacts will likely be
incremental in nature. If Congress expects to restore public confidence in the political process, however, it should
move expeditiously to enact a bold and comprehensive
package of campaign finance reforms.
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Conclusion
The political experiences in the intervening years since
the Supreme Court first established the doctrine governing campaign finance in Buckley v. Valeo have brought us
to a point of urgency. Judge J. Skelly Wright eloquently
described our present crisis in democracy more than seven
years ago
When money becomes more important than
people, when media mastery weighs more heavily than appeals to judgment, when opportunities to communicate with voters are extremely
unequal, the result is a cynical distortion of the
electoral process. The peoples choices are not
based on their informed preferences among
ideas and candidates and government of the
people, by the people, and for the people becomes an empty shibboleth.'34
Democratic institutions in America are more accurately
characterized as government of the PACs, by the PACs,
and for the PACs. Restoring representative democracy and
enhancing political participation and equality requires that
the influence of special interest money in politics be significantly diluted, if not eliminated. It is time for Congress
to muster up the political will to enact strong new campaign finance reforms. Moreover, it is time for the Supreme
Court to abandon the misguided doctrine of Buckley v.
Valeo.

INTHE PUBLIC INTEREST

ENDNOTES
1. See infra notes 99-101, 103-108, and accompanying text.
2. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). See infra notes 16-36, and accompanying text.
In Buckley, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional restrictions on
campaign contributions by candidates to their own campaign and on spending by individuals and groups independent of any campaign. The Court
upheld limits on direct contributions by individuals or groups. Spending
by a candidate on his/her own campaign and independent expenditures
were considered by the Court to be protected forms of political expression and thus could not be limited. The Buckley Court also determined
that Congress had a legitimate concern with preventing corruption, or the
appearance of corruption, that could arise from unlimited direct campaign
contributions.
3. In the 1832 presidential race, Jackson and his Whig opponent Clay
fought over the fate of the Bank of the United States. 'During the campaign, the U.Schartered but semi-autonomous bank spent heavily to support the Whig challenger. Clay pressed for congressional action on a bill
to renew the bank's charter, believing that if Jackson vetoed the bill, he
would lose Pennsylvania - the bank was located in Philadelphia - and
other Eastern states in the election. The strategy backfired. Jackson met
the challenge with a strong veto message describing the bank as a'money
monster; He campaigned against it effectively and won the election easily." Cong. Q., Inc., Dollar Politics 3 (3rd ed. 1982).
4. Act of March 2, 1867, Ch. 172, 14 stat. 409 (1867).
5. Act of Jan. 16, 1883, Ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883).
6. Act of Jan. 26, 1907, Pub. L No. 36,34 Stat. 864 (1907) (current
version of 2 U.S.C. Section 441(b) (1981)).
7. The efforts of the muckrakers resulted in the first significant campaign finance restrictions. "Reacting to the increasing lavish corporate involvement in political campaigns, the hearty band of reformers known as
the muckrakers pressed for the nation's first extensive campaign finance
legislation. During the first decade of the 20th century, they worked to
expose the influence bn government that was exerted by big business
through unrestrained spending on behalf of favored candidates In 1905,
President Theodore Roosevelt's annual message to Congress called for
a prohibition on "all contributions by corporations to any political committee or for any political purpose In response, Congress passed the
Tillman Act. Cong. Q., Inc., supra note 3, at 4.
The 1943 War Labor Disputes Act extended the Tillman Act ban
on contributions by corporations and national banks to certain financial
activities of labor unions. (Pub. L Not 89, Section 9 57 Stat 163, 167-168
(1944) The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act extended the ban on contributions by
corporations, banks and labor organizations to cover primaries as well
as general elections. (18 U.S.C. Section 610 (1970 ed.) The effect of the
language of Section 610 is to prohibit the use of union or corporate treasury funds for active electioneering directed at the general public on behalf
of a candidate in a federal election. Corporations and labor unions are
allowed under the Federal Election Campaign Act (see infra, note 12 and
accompanying text), however, to use treasury funds to solicit contributions for a "separate segregated fund" (ipe,a PAC) which would engage
in political spending.
8. Act of Feb. 28, 1925, Ch. 368, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925).
9. E. Drew, Money and Politics: The New Road to Corruption 7 (1983).
10. Unreported individual and corporate campaign contributions were
at the heart of Watergate, one of the nations foremost political scandals.
The activities of the 1972 campaign to re-elect Richard Nixon were financed
largely by unreported campaign contributions. According to John Gardner, head of a citizens watchdog group Common Cause, in 1973, "Watergate is not primarily a story of political espionage, nor even of White House
intrigue It is a particularly malodorous chapter in the annals of campaign
financing. The money paid to the Watergate conspirators before the breakin- and money passed to them later - was money from campaign gifts:"
This charge was later proven accurate when tape recordings of Nixon's
conversation with staff revealed that Nixon knew of - and agreed to cover
SPRING 1990

up - the use of campaign funds in the Watergate break-in. Cong. Q.,
Inc., supra note 3, at 10, 11.
11. See generally, Nicholson, Campaign Financeand Equal Protection, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 815 (1974).
12. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L No. 92-225, 86
Stat 3 (1972); Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, Pub. L Na 93443,
88 stat. 1263 (1974) (both laws now codified as amended at 2 U.S. C.
Sections 431-455 (1976)).
13. PACs are not easily categorized. 'The category 'political action
committee' actually encompasses an enormously diverse set of organizations. The FEC's categories - labor, corporate, trade/member/health, nonconnected, cooperative, and corporation without stock - only begin to
suggest the variety. Even within each of these categories, PACs differ widely.
Some are little more than entrepreneurs with mailing lists; others are adjuncts of large corporations or labor unions. In some, all contribution
decisions are made centrally-, others encourage extensive input from members. Some have immediate, narrow, self-interested goals; others pursue
long-term objectives involving widely shared values or collective goods.
Most PACs only give money; but a few of them also supply campaign
workers, work to get out the vote, produce advertising, advise on campaign strategy, and recruit and train candidates. Some participate in coalitions of PACs or cooperate with one of the parties; others make
independent decisions' Jacobson, Partiesand PACs in Congressional Elections, contained in L. Dodd and B. Oppenheimer, Congress
Reconsidered 121 (1989).
See generally, E. Roeder, PACs Americana: A Directory of
Political Action Committees and their Interests (1982); M.
Weinberger and D. Greevy, A Complete Guide to Political Action Committees (1982); L. Sabato, PAC Power: Inside the
World of Political Action Committees (1985).
14. P. Stern, The Best Congress Money Can Buy 23 (1988).
15. L. Malkinson, The Price of Admission: An Illustrated Atlas of Campaign Spending in the 1988 Congressional
Elections 14 (1989).
16. Soon after the 1974 amendments to FECA took effect, the law
was challenged in court by a diverse array of plaintiffs including Senator
James L Buckley, Cons-R-NY, former Senator Eugene McCarthy, D-MN,
the New York Civil Liberties Union and Human Events, a conservative
publication. The action was brought against the FEC and various govemment officials in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,
challenging the constitutionality of certain provisions of the FECA of 1971
and the provisions of Subtitle H of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
(26 USCS Section 9001 et seq.) for public financing of Presidential election campaigns. The District Court certified the constitutional questions
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which
rejected the Plaintiffs' constitutional attacks. (519 F2d 821 (1975)). A
three judge District Court sat jointly with the Court of Appeals to hear
the challenge to Section H of the Internal Revenue Code; the District Court
adopted the Appeals Court opinion on this matter. (401 FSupp 1235
(1975) ).On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed
in part. See infra notes 17-36, and accompanying text.
17. 424 US. 1, 14 (1976).
18. Id. at 26, 29.
19. Alexander, The Future of Election Reform, 724 Hastings
Const. L. Q. 721, 724 (1983).
20. 424 U.S. at 39-59.
21. Id. at 23-38.
22. Id. at 60-84.
23. Id. at 109-143.
24. Id. at 85-109.
25. Id. at 108-109. In Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC), 470 U.S. 480 (1985), the
Court declared unconstitutional the $1,000 limit on expenditures by PACs
for the benefit of presidential candidates who voluntarily accept public
financing. See infra notes 48-52, and accompanying text.
26. "The term 'independent expenditure' means an expenditure by
a person expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identi-

4

fied candidate which is made without cooperation or consultation with
any candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of such candidate,
and which is not made in concert with, or at the request or suggestion
of, any candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of such a candidate." 2 U.S.C. 431 (17) (1982 and Supp. IV 1896). See also 11 C.FR.
Section 109 (1987) (further defining the statutory term).
"Independent" expenditures are theoretically made on behalf of a particular candidate or campaign, but without direct coordination or prearrangement with the campaign. See infra, notes 36, 52, 81 and
accompanying text "Independent" expenditures often include media spots,
flyers, and other literature advocating the candidacy of a particular person, the financing of events to support a candidate, etc.
See generally, Richards, The Rise and Fallof the Contribution/Expenditure Distinction: Redefining the Acceptable Range of CampaignFinance
Reform, 18 New Eng. L. Rev. 367, 369-375 (1983).
27. 424 US. 1, 20-21 (1976).
28. Id. at 26.
29. Id. at 27.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 27 (citing CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 US. 548,565 (1973)).
34. Id. at 19; see also id. at 39-51.
35. Id. at 47-48.
36. Id. at 46. It is difficult to understand how the Court could naively conclude that "independent" expenditures do not pose a serious threat
of corruption. "Indrawing this distinction between contributions and expenditures, the Court failed to acknowledge that, whenever financial support of a candidate is both visible and significant to the candidate or his
campaign staff, there is a risk of improper influence The larger and more
exceptional the expenditure, the more likely it is that the candidate will
notice and respond to it, even without any direct coordination or prearrangement. Thus, the same interests that justify limits on contributions
and coordinated expenditures should also justify limits on independent
expenditures, albeit at higher levels than the former: Blum, The Divisible
First Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1273, n. 304 (1983).
As discussed infra note 52, 82, and accompanying text, it is highly
questionable whether "independent" expenditures are truly made in the
absence of coordination with the official campaign effort.
37. See generally, Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics,82 Colum. L. Rev. 609 (1982); Blum, supra note 36; Bernhardt, Campaign
Finance Reform and the FirstAmendment: All the Free Speech Money
Can Buy, 39 Okla. L. Rev. 729 (1986); Cox, ConstitutionalIssues in
the Regulation of the Financingof Election Campaigns,31 Clev. St. L.
Rev. 395, 410 (1982); Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo: The Constitutionality of the FederalElection CampaignAct Amendments of 1974, Wis. L.
Rev. 323 (1977); Shockey, Money and Politics:JudicialRoadblocks to
Campaign Finance Reform, 10 Hastings Const. L. Q. 679 (1984);
Drew, supra note 9; But, see Bevier, Money and Politics:A Perspective
on the FirstAmendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 Calif. L.
Rev. 1045 (1985).
38. Wright, supra note 37.
39. See, for example, First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765 (1978) (invalidating a Massachusetts law that prohibited banks
and business corporations from making expenditures to influence the vote
on referendum proposals that did not materially affect their business,
property or assets); California Medical Association v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), 453 U.S. 182 (1981) (plurality opinion) (upholding constitutionality of a provision of Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
limiting contributions of an unincorporated association to multi-candidate
political committees); Citizens Against Rent Control (CARC) v.Berkeley,
454 U.S. 290 (1981) (invalidating a limitation on contributions to committees formed to support or oppose ballot measures); FEC v. National
Right to Work Committee, 459 US. 197 (1982) (upholding constitutionality of provisions of Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 prohibiting
nonprofit, noncapital stock corporations from soliciting political contributions from nonmembers); FEC v. National Conservative Political Ac-

42

tion Committee, 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (invalidating section of the
Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act that prohibited political committees from making independent expenditures in excess of $1,000 to
support the election of a presidential candidate who had opted to receive
public financing); FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238
(1986) (invalidating section of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
as applied to nonprofit corporation that prohibited direct expenditure of
corporate funds in connection with any election); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, NQ 88-1569 (US., March 27, 1990) (available in Westlaw) (upholding constitutionality of Michigan state law which prohibits
corporations from using general treasury funds for independent expendi.
tures in connection with state candidate elections).
40. See Cox, supra note 37, at 418. Cox explains that in the future
the connection between corruption and expenditures might be recognized
by the Court. "Although it would seem difficult, if not impossible, to prove
categorically the factual connection that Justices Marshall, Blackmun and
O'Connor found not to have been demonstrated, it seems quite probable
that judicial understanding may change as the public comprehension of
the evil increases.. "
See alsq White's dissent in FEC v. National Conservative Political
Action Committee, 470 U.S. 480, 510 (n.7) (1985), 'The possibility was
left open, and remains open, that unforeseen developments in the financing of campaigns might make the need for restrictions on "independent"
expenditures more compelling. The time may come when the govemmental
interests in restricting such expenditures will be sufficiently compelling to
satisfy not only Congress but a majority of this Court: See also supra
note 36.
41. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
42. Id. at 789.
43. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
44. Id. at 257, 258. The Congress and the Supreme Court have long
supported the need for some regulation of corporate political activity. Since
the Tillman Act of 1907, corporations have been prohibited from making
contributions from their treasuries to campaigns for federal office. Section 316 of FECA (2 U.S.C. Section 441b) prohibits corporations from
using treasury funds to make campaign expenditures and requires the use
of separate segregated funds for such purposes. The rationale behind regulation of corporate political activity has been described by the Supreme
Court as the need to "eliminate the effect of aggregated wealth on federal
elections' (Pipefitters v. U.S., 407 U.S. 385, 416 (1972) to curb the political influence of "those who exercise control over large aggregations of capital: US. v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567,585 (1972); and to regulate
the substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages
which go with the corporate form of organization,' FEC v.National Right
to Work Committee, 459 U.S. 197, 207 (1982).
45. 479 US. at 259.
46. Nicholson, Basic Principlesor Theoretical Tangles: Analyzing the
Constitutionality of Government Regulation of Campaign Finance, 38
Case Western L. Rev. 589,596 (1988). The constitutionality of regulating the political expression of business corporations was recently upheld
by a six-member majority of the Supreme Court. On March 27, 1990,
the Court in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, supra note 39,
upheld a Michigan law that prohibited corporations from using general
treasury funds for independent expenditures in connection with state candidate elections. Similar to Section 316 of FECA, the Michigan law required corporations to create separate segregated funds from which to
make independent expenditures. According to the Court, "they are justified by a compelling state interest: preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption in the political arena by reducing the threat that huge
corporate treasuries, which are amassed with the aid of favorable state
laws and have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporations political ideas, will be used to influence unfairly election outcomes.
Id.
47. 479 U.S. 238, 259. According to Marlene Nicholson, a legal
scholar who specializes incampaign finance, "areasonable argument could
be made that the lack of [campaign expenditure] limitations have made
it nearly impossible to curb the 'corrosive influence' they spoke of in

IN THE PUBUC INTEREST

MCF1" Testimony of Professor Marlene Nicholson, DePaul College of Law,
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, February 28, 1990 at 10. In discussing the ramifications of MCFL, Nicholson has written, 'It is quite clear
that the PAC requirement has not been a serious impediment to extensive involvement by business corporations and unions in the political
process. MCFL presents the possibility that more meaningful regulation
of these entities would be constitutional: Nicholson, supra note 46, at 602.
48. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
49. Id at 497-498.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Bernhardt supranote 37, at 736, 739-741. Coordination between
candidates and PACs can be achieved in a variety of ways, including 'indirect" communications between staff, the use of common consultants,
and by seating some of the same people on boards and campaign committees. In the NCPAC case, 'vhat is most astonishing is not simply that
the Supreme Court found the PAC expenditures innocent because independent, but that it did so when it was confronted with numerous documented incidents of coordination committed with the bald-faced intent to
circumvent the congressional limitations on spending. Id. at 740. It is quite
clear that NCPAC and Ronald Reagan's official campaign organization
coordinated extensively. For example, policy briefings between NCPAC
and Reagan Cabinet officers took place; a founder of NCPAC served as
Reagan's Midwest coordinator, and the Reagan campaign and NCPAC
shared the same political consultant, pollster, direct mail and solicitation
firms, printing house and office supplier. Id. at 739-740.
53. See 470 U.S. at 497. 1. . preventing corruption or the appearance
of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling reasons thus far
identified for restricting campaign finances (emphasis added)"
54. J. Madison, Federalist No. 57, at 385 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
55. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
56. Id at 565. Although the ideals of political equality and representation have historically been compromised by economic inequities, racial
and gender biases, and other obstacles, the law in this country has slowly advanced to promote universal suffrage and political equality. At the
federal level, several constitutional amendments have extended voting rights
to new categories of citizens. See, for example, US. Constitutional Amend.
XIX (admitting women to suffrage); Amend. XXIV (abolition of poll tax
as a precondition for voting); Amend. XXVI (admitting 18-to-21-year-olds
to vote). The civil rights movement of the 1960's also achieved important
gains under the law to promote voter influence.
57. E. Drew supra note 9, at 5.
58. Congressional Research Service, Campaign Finance in Federal Elections: A Guide to the Law and Its Operation, 89-451
Gov 2 (1989). The Center for Responsive Politics has reported 'over the
longer term, the cost of elections to Congress has escalated at a pace
more than double the rate of inflation. Average House campaigns have
risen in cost by more than 500 percent since the numbers were first tabulated in 1974. Senate races have grown at an even faster pace. The average Senate campaign in 1974 cost just $423,000. By 1988 that average
had grown to nearly $3 million." L. Malkinson supra note 15, at 10.
59. L. Malkinson supra note 15, at 8.
60. P. Stern, supra note 14, at 13. In testimony before a Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee, Senator Ernest Hollings (D-SC) stated, 'This obsession with money distracts us from the people's business. At worst it
corrupts and degrades the political process. Fundraisers used to be arranged so that they didn't conflict with the Senate schedule; nowadays,
the Senate schedule is regularly shifted to accommodate fundraisers, Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on the Constitution, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1990) (testimony of Senator Ernest Hollings).
61. 'The candidates who spent the most won the most In the House,
414 of the 435 winners spent more than their opponents. In the Senate,
top spenders won 29 out of 33 seats. L. Malkinson supra note 15, at
8. See also,G. Jacobson, Money in Congressional Elections 157
(1980). Jacobson points out that the correlation between money and election outcome is not simple "'The preponderance of evidence... supports
the original explanation that challengers and other nonincumbents do better

SPRING 1990

the more they spend because their campaign expenditures purchase the
attention of voters." The effect of money is most clear-cut in elections for
open seats, where there is no incumbent. Money is not as critical a factor
for the success of incumbents who have other advantages of office-holding.
Id. at 48-49.
62. Public Citizen's Congress Watch, House Insurance: How the
Permanent Congress Hoards Campaign Cash (1989). Public
Citizen is a citizen watchdog organization founded by consumer advocate Ralph Nader. Public Citizen's Congress Watch is a leading advocate
for campaign finance reform.
Because incumbents have a record of service, regular news coverage
and, as a result, name recognition, they have a natural advantage over
challengers. Congressional incumbents also enjoy the congressional franking privilege which allows them to communicate regularly with their constituents, postage free
63. Id. at 2.
64. Id. at 1.
65. Id. at 3.
66. L. Malkinson, supra note 15 at 3.
67. See L. Malkinson, supra note 15. According to the Center for
Responsive Politics, 'he proportion of PAC receipts to total receipts has
been on the rise since the early 1970s, while the share from all other sources
- including individuals and political parties - has been declining. In 1974
PAC contributions accounted for only 17 percent of the campaign receipts
going to House candidates. By 1988 that proportion had risen to 37 percent" Id. at 9.
68. P. Stern, supra note 14, at 195.
69. Cox, supra note 37, at 410.
70. See generally P. Stern supra note 14; E. Drew, supra note 9;
G. Jacobson, supra note 61; B. Jackson, Honest Graft, (1988);
Cox, supra note 37; Cong. Q., Inc., supra note 3; Common Cause, How
Money Talks in Congress, (1979). As a former lobbyist for a consumer
and environmental group in Washington, D.C., the author confirms that
the conventional view of national politics is that the primary purpose of
the PACs is to purchase access and votes.
71. L. Sabat supra note 13, at 127.
72. Cox, supranote 37, at 401, citing Running With the PACs, Time
Magazine, October 25, 1982, at 20.
73. Id. Many members of Congress have been quoted complaining
about the influence of money on the voting process. For example 'Anytime someone, whether a person or a PAC gives you a large sum of money,
you can't help but feel the need to give the extra attention, whether it is
access to your time or, subconsciously, the obligation to vote with them."
Rep. John Bryant (D-TX); "Weare the only human beings in the world
who are expected to take thousands of dollars from perfect strangers on
important matters and not be affected by it."Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA);
"Ifear we could become a coin-operated Congress. Instead of two bits,
you put in $2,500 and pull out a vote Rep. Barbara Mikulski (D-MD);
' he only reason it isn't considered bribery is that Congress gets to define bribery." Rep. Andrew Jacobs (R-IN). L. Sabato supra note 13, at
126, 127.
74. L. Sabato, supra note 13, at 136. See also P. Stern, supra
note 14, at 123-127.
75. L. Malkinson, supra note 15, at 9.
76. P. Stern, supra note 14, at 5.
77. Wright, supranote 37, at 618. See generally supranote 70; Wertheimer and Huwa, Campaign Finance Reform: Past Accomplishments,
Future Challenges,10 NYU Rev. of Corn. and Soc. C. 43, Notes 40,
41, and accompanying text (1980-81); Wertheimer. The PAC Phenomenon in American Politics, 22 Arizona Law Rev. 603 (1980); P.Stern,
supra note 14. For specific examples, see A. Allen, PAC Contributions
Influence Clean Air Act Votes (1989) (unpublished manuscript available
from U.S. P.I.R.G.); K. Welch, Nuclear Power Industry PAC Study (1987)
(unpublished manuscript available from U.S. P.I.R.G.). This author notes
from personal experience (detailed in part in the preceding study) that PAC
activities do appear to have an effect on legislative outcomes. For example, it is not uncommon for certain industry PACs to schedule fundrais-

43

I
ing events for individual members of congressional committee just before
or after key committee votes. In Washington lobbying circles the correlation between PAC activities and legislative outcomes is quite obvious, rarely
disputed, and accepted as part of 'playing the game" But see, Wright PACs,
Contributions,and Roll Calls: An OrganizationalPerspective 79 American Political Science Review 400 (1985); Budde, The PracticalRole
of CorporatePACs in the PoliticalProcess, 22 Arizona Law Rev. 55
(1980). For a discussion of both viewpoints, see Kenski, Running From
the PAG 22 Arizona Law Rev. 627, 643-644 (1980). Also see generally, L. Sabato, supra note 13. Sabato concludes that 'the available evidence seems to be that PAC contributions do make a difference at least
on some occasions, in securing access and influencing the course of events
on the House and Senate floors" Id. at 135. Sabato points out, however,
that the occasions are more limited than PAC critics and members of Congress suggest.
78. P. Simon, Top Guns: A Common Cause Guide to Defense Contractor Lobbying 36, 41 (1987).
79. P. Stern, supra note 14, at 5-6.
80. Cox, supra,note 37, at 411 (citing 127 Cong.Rec. H 4911 (July
27, 1981)).
81 Bernhardt, supra note 37 at 739. See also supra, notes 36, 52.
A television interview during the 1980 Presidential campaign with Senator Jesse Helms, chairman of the independent North Carolina Congressional Club, which made expenditures on behalf of President Reagan, points
further to the problem of coordination. "Well, as you may know, we have
an independent effort going in North Carolina. Uh, the law forbids me
to consult with him [Mr. Reagan], and ifs been an awkward situation. Ive
had to, sort of, uh, talk indirectly with Mr. Paul Laxalt [Reagan's campaign
chairman], and hope that he would pass along... uh and I ... I think
the messages have gotten through all right.. : O'Neill, Independent Spending, Political Action Committees, and the Need for Further Campaign
Finance Reform, 37 Depaul L. Rev. 611, 633 (1988), citing Brief for
Appellants at 31, Common Cause v. Schmitt, 455 U.S. 129 (1982).
82. ONeill, supra note 81, at 633.
83. Public Citizen, Herds How You Pay For Our Corrupt Campaign
Finance System (fact sheet on file with author). See also,Babcock, What's
In A Name? If Keating, Plenty, Washington Post, February 15, 1990.
84. P. Stern, supra note 14, at 15.
85. Peddling Influence, Time Magazine March 3, 1986 at 36.
86. H. Alexander, Financing the 1980 Election 80 (1983).
87. Chevigny, The Paradoxof Campaign Finance 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
206, 213 (1981).
88. Adamany, PoliticalAction Committees and DemocraticPolitics,
4 Det. C. L. Rev. 1013, 1020 (1983).
89. E. Drew, supra note 9, at 96.
90. Wright, supra note 37, at 619. Not all commentators agree that
PACs are undemocratic. See generally Budde, supra note 77.
91. Adamany, PACs and the Democratic Financing of Politics 22
Ariz. L. Rev. 569, 596 (1980).
92. D. Adamany, supra note 88, at 1014 (citing D. Adamany,
Financing Politics 12 (1969).
93. Id.
94. Adamany, supra note 92, at 571.
95. See supra notes 6-52, and accompanying text.
96. Bernhardt,supranote 37, at 742, note 111. See also P. Stern
supra note 14.
97. See supra note 28, and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 73, and accompanying text.
99. Greenberg-Lake, Money and Politics:A Survey of NationalOpinion 2 (March 3, 1990) (sponsored by The Advocacy Institute, Public Citizen
and People for the American Way). According to the poll:
The American public has turned against Washington and the
Congress in the past year - and are increasingly doubtful of congfessional ethics and the role of money in politics. Voters are in
an anti-political mood. They are prepared to think the worst of politicians and respond to attacks that highlight how members, obligated to special interests, have lost touch with people The

scandals surrounding the savings and loan Industry, In particular,
have created a political moment where voters are able to make
a conceptual link between campaign money and their own Interests
and quality of representation. The overwhelming majority of voters
believe the current system for financing campaigns Is basically unsound, and an increasing number are prepared to turn to a new
system, including one based on public financing. Id. at 1.
100. See generally, ONeill, Supra note 81, at 638, n. 213.
101. See supra note 53.
102. Chiles, PACs: Congresson the Auction Block 11 Journal of
Legislation 193, 211 (1984) (citing Campaign Finance Proposals of
1983: Hearingson the FederalElection Campaign on Rules and Administration,98th Congress, 1st Session 46 (1983), (statement of Charles McC.
Mathias, Senator, R-MD)).
103. Cox, supra note 37, at 401.
104. Bernhardt, supra note 37, at 746, citing Packwood, Campaign
Finance,Communicationsand the FirstAmendment, 10 Hastings Cont.
L. Q. 745, 783-84. See also, Ladd, Opinion Roundup, Public Opinion 32 (Apr./May 1980). Also, note that in 1986 only 33.4 percent of
those old enough to cast ballots actually did so for House candidates,
the lowest turnout since 1930. B. Jackson, Honest Graft (1988). 84
percent of Americans between the ages of 18-21 who were eligible to vote
in the 1986 House and Senate elections failed to do so. Testimony of Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA), before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee
on the Constitution, February 28, 1990 at 3. See generally, W Crotty
& G. Jacobson, American Politics in Decline (1986). The authors
note that, "American voting turnout over time is decreasing and it has
reached unusual lows... Nonvoters are basically inactive on all levels.
If people do not vote the chances are excellent that they will not participate in any other form of the political process. In effect they remain outside the political system, unrepresented and ignored" Id. at 6, 13.
105. Cranston, supra note 104, at 2-3.
106. E. Drew, supra note 9, at 156.
107. Rosenthal, CampaignFinancingand the Constitution,9 Harv.
J. on Legis. 359, 360 (1972).
108. See supra note 73.
109. Political scandals in recent years have shaken the top leadership in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. The savings
and loan scandal (see supra note 83, and accompanying text) resulted
in the ethics investigation of five Senators. In addition, Senators Dave
Durenberger (R-MN) and Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY) were also Investigated
for campaign and other financial improprieties. House Speaker Jim Wright
(D-TX) and House Majority Whip Tony Coehlo (D-CA) resigned under the
pressure of Ethics Committee investigations of their financial dealings,
110. Testimony of David Eppler, Staff Attorney, Public Citizen, before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, February
28, 1990.
111. Testimony of Joan Claybrook, President of Public Citizen, before the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, March 1, 1990
The coalition includes Public Citizen, Common Cause American Association of Retired Persons, National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People Episcopal Church, National Farmers Organization, National Urban League The American Jewish Committee People for the
American Way, the United States Student Association, Environmental
Action, and many others.
112. Greenberg-Lake supra note 99.
113. See supra note 37.
114. The FEC's enforcement record has been severely criticized. See
generally, Novak and Cobb, The Kindness of Strangers,Common Cause
Sept./Oct. 35 (1987); O'Connor, Who's Afraid of the FEC?, 18 Wash.
Monthly 22, 26 (March 1986); Buchsbaum, CampaignFinanceReform:
the Regulation of Independent Political Committees, 71 Calif. L. Rev.
673, 688-91 (1983); Public Citizen's Congress Watch, supra note 62, at
5; P. Stern, supra note 14. For a thorough discussion of reforms needed
to strengthen the FEC, see P. Stern, supra note 14 and Stem, Campaign Finance: The FederalElection Commission, printed in M. Green,
America's Transition: Blueprints for the 1990s 387 (1989).
41

44

INTHE PUBLIC INTEREST

115. F. Wertheimer, supra note 77, at 617.
116. Id.
117. Claybrook, supra note 111.
118. Public Citizen, Campaign Finance Reform Briefing Packet 5
(1990) (on file with author) [hereinafter Briefing Packet].
119. Public financing has received broad support See generally supra
notes 14, 37, 77, 87, 91, 94, 111, 115; Testimony of the American Civil
Liberties Union before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, February 28, 1990.
120. Wright, supra note 37, at 643. See also Wertheimer, supra note
77, at 619 (stating that the Supreme Court would uphold public financing as constitutional).
121. It should be pointed out that in order for spending limits to be
constitutional, they must be voluntary. It is also important to allow viable
candidates a realistic chance to compete. The coalition of national organizations supporting campaign finance reforms advocates spending
limits, but not without substantial public financing. 'If spending limits are
imposed, but inadequate public benefits are provided, candidates will still
be forced to spend too much time fundraising" Supra note 111.
122. Briefing Packet supra note 118, at 6.
123. See Wertheimer and Huwa, supra note 77, at 58.
124. P. Stern supra note 14; Wright, supranote 37, at 644; Rosenthal, supro note 107.
125. See supra note 12.
126. F. Wertheimer, Campaign Finance Reform: Past Accomplishments, Future Chollenges, 10 Rev. L. Soc. Ch. 43, at 55 (1980-81).
127. Adamany, supra note 88, at 1025.
128. Public Citizen, supra note 118, at 4.
129. Id.
130. According to the Washington Post, 'the Senate has debated campaign finance revision proposals for years without reaching a consensus
both parties could support. Republican leaders blocked the last effort in
1988 over Democrats insistence on public financing. Babcock, supra note
83.
131. As of the writing of this paper, action on campaign finance reform legislation was not complete. This paper does not attempt to analyze any of these proposals in detail as the legislative picture is changing

SPRING 1990

on a daily basis. Of the more than 30 bills introduced, those that received
the most legislative attention included S 137 (introduced by Senators Boren,
Mitchell and Byrd), and HR 14 (introduced by Representatives Synar and
Leach). These bills included, inter alia, restrictions on PACs, spending limits,
reductions in mail and media costs, and limitations on the use of soft
money. The Bush Administration and Senator DeConcini (R-AZ) also drafted a proposal which addressed many of these issues. As of this writing,
additional proposals were also in the drafting stage. Although the bills
tended to address the same issues, the specific treatment of the issues
varied greatly. Of particular interest was Senate Joint Resolution 48, introduced by Senator Earnest Hollings (D-SC). S.J. Res. 48 proposed a
constitutional amendment to restore to Congress the power to establish
expenditure limitations in federal campaigns. If ratified by the states, the
amendment would overrule the Supreme Courfs decision in Buckley.
132. According to the Washington Post, "With ethics investigations
pending against seven senators, some involving campaign contributions,
senators were united in a desire for action but locked into entrenched positions, reinforced by suspicion, competitiveness and concern over loss
of face. The solution had to be a new formulation, originated by butsiders'
and unsullied with either hostile camp in the Senate Dewar, Finally,Campaign FundReform?, Washington Post, March 12, 1990 at A13. Senate
Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-ME), Senate Minority Leader Robert
Dole (R-KS) and other Senate leaders on this issue expressed optimism
about the proposal. Id.
The panel's proposal called for "flexible spending limits; to 'curb outof-state contributions and special-interest money while encouraging candidates to raise funds in relatively small amounts from individual voters
in their home states" Id. These limits would not apply to all contributions
and would be 'reasonably high" Id. Incentives for compliance with these
limits included reduced postal and broadcast rates and a tax credit for
in-state individuals who contribute to a complying candidate.
133. The panel's proposals were described as a political compromise
with insufficient public financing, inadequate spending limits, and weak
provisions to curb PAC activities and other fundraising loopholes. Conversation with Craig McDonald, Campaign Finance Reform Coalition Coordinator, March 13, 1990.
134. Wright, supra note 37, at 631.

OF
Aw

4K

k:

46

INTHE PUBUC INTEREST

